Date/Time
Date(s) - 03/10/2025
11:00 am - 12:30 pm

Siyang Xiong, Professor from the University of California will present to our economics graduate students and faculty, Friday, October 3 in KTH 334!

Siyang will present the paper, “On the Robustness of Blockchain-Based Oracle Mechanisms”.

Abstract

The game theoretic analysis of blockchain-based oracle mechanism assumes that reporting agents commonly know the realized state of the world. We analyze the robustness of oracle mechanisms under perturbations to common knowledge. A Bayes Nash equilibrium is continuous if for any sequence of types converging to common knowledge, the equilibrium strategies converge to the equilibrium strategies at complete information. An oracle mechanism satisfies strong continuous implementation if all of its continuous BNE implement the true state. We show that any oracle mechanism that does not provide payments to reporting agents in an oracle native coin, fails strong continuous implementation. We further show that any normal-form oracle mechanism that satisfies strong continuous implementation is either dictatorial or vulnerable to single-deviations, where a single agent can (probabilistically) prevent the implementation of the true state. To address
this weakness, we propose a sequential direct voting mechanism. We show that this sequential mechanism satisfies strong sequential-continuous implementation and is not vulnerable to single-deviations.

Learn more about Siyang’s work and connect with him through his professional website.